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Telephone Rates
(continued from page 145)
jected directory assistance usage
data or its corresponding revenue
and expense projections. Because
these omissions precluded inde-
pendent verification of the reliabil-
ity of United's figures, the district
court found that OCA's concerns
regarding inflated numbers and
duplicate recovery were validated.
Finally, because the Utilities
Board had failed to furnish OCA
with the calculations that led it to
conclude that the increases were
just and reasonable, its conclusion
was open to dispute.
On appeal to the supreme court,
United argued that the district
court's findings were merely a reit-
eration OCA's contentions. United
claimed that unless OCA presented
its own contrary data refuting
United's calculations, OCA had
not disputed material facts making
an evidentiary hearing worth-
while. Although the supreme court
agreed that purely legal disputes
did not warrant an evidentiary
hearing, the court dismissed Unit-
ed's argument.
The supreme court agreed with
the lower court's findings that
OCA has raised sufficient factual
issues warranting an evidentiary
hearing. The court found that the
Utilities Board had mistakenly de-
cided that no genuine dispute re-
garding material facts existed when
it relied solely on United's version
of the facts and prevented OCA's
challenge. Because OCA repre-
sented United's consumers in this
case, the court held that constitu-
tional considerations necessitated
that OCA be given the opportunity
to examine and to test the credibil-
ity of the data upon which the
Utilities Board based it decision.
The supreme court therefore af-
firmed the district court's remand
to the agency for further proceed-
ings. Aida M. Alaka
Insurance Agent May
Have Bound Company
To Temporary
Insurance Policy
Despite
Misrepresentation By
Insured
In Ellingwood v. N.N. Investors
Life Insurance Co., Inc., 805 P.2d
70 (N.M. 1991), the Supreme
Court of New Mexico held that
genuine issues of material fact ex-
isted with respect to the authority
of an insurance agent to bind the
company to an oral contract for
temporary insurance coverage and
with respect to alleged misrepre-
sentations made on an application
for insurance coverage.
Background
On October 30, 1985, James
Streeter ("Streeter") applied for
health and life insurance from
N.N. Investors Life Insurance Co.
("N.N. Investors"). Streeter suf-
fered from scoliosis, a spinal defor-
mity, which was plainly visible.
The agent for N.N. Investors asked
Streeter questions and completed
the application forms based on
Streeter's verbal responses. The
agent asked whether Streeter ever
had any indication, diagnosis or
treatment of various respiratory
diseases or muscle and bone disor-
ders, to which Streeter replied,
"No." The agent indicated on the
form that Streeter's lower spine
had been surgically fused and re-
corded the name, address, and
phone number of Streeter's treat-
ing physician. Streeter did not
have a physical examination or
interview with a physician prior to
completing the insurance applica-
tion of N.N. Investors.
The language of the application
provided that coverage would not
be effective until the insurance
company approved the application
and the applicant paid the first
premium. Streeter signed the ap-
plication and asked the agent when
coverage would be effective. Ac-
cording to the affidavit of Stree-
ter's grandmother, the agent re-
sponded, in her presence, that
coverage would begin upon receipt
of payment of the first premium;
when Streeter paid the agent, the
agent replied that coverage was in
effect at that time. Relying solely
on the application, the company
subsequently approved major
medical and term life insurance
coverage for Streeter. The insur-
ance certificate stated that cover-
age would begin at 12:00 noon on
November 12, 1985.
On November 10, 1985, Streeter
entered a hospital emergency room
for treatment of severe bronchial
pneumonia. Streeter died 3:40
a.m. on November 12, just over
eight hours prior to the time of
effectiveness of coverage, as stated
on the insurance certificate.
Claims and Defenses
Upon receipt of claims under
the insurance policies, N.N. Inves-
tors investigated Streeter's medical
history and discovered that he suf-
fered from scoliosis and had suf-
fered pulmonary problems in the
past. N.N. Investors claimed that
Streeter's failure to disclose these
medical conditions amounted to
material misrepresentations. As a
result, N.N. Investors refused to
pay benefits under the policies and
refunded the premiums paid by
Streeter to date. In addition to the
claim of misrepresentation, N.N.
Investors argued that under the
terms of the application, insurance
coverage was not effective until
approved by the company. N.N.
Investors argued that the terms of
the agreement excluded coverage
for pre-existing conditions; since
the pneumonia occurred prior to
the effective date of coverage, it
constituted such a pre-existing
condition.
In response, Patricia Ellingwood
("Ellingwood"), as representative
of Streeter's estate, sued N.N. In-
vestors for breach of contract and
negligence. Ellingwood claimed
that N.N. Investors's agent had
apparent authority to bind the in-
surance company by oral agree-
ment to temporary insurance cov-
erage effective upon receipt of
payment. Ellingwood further
claimed that N.N. Investors violat-
ed a statute regulating temporary
insurance coverage which she
claimed constituted negligence per
se on the part of N.N. Investors
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and its agent. N.M. Stat. Ann. 1978
§ 59A-18-22 (1988).
The District Court
The District Court, Curry Coun-
ty, granted summary judgment for
N.N. Investors. The court noted
that N.N. Investors had a right of
rescission because Streeter made
material misrepresentations of fact
on his application. The court also
concluded that the application un-
ambiguously stated that coverage
was not effective until it was ap-
proved by the company. Elling-
wood appealed the summary judg-
ment order.
The Supreme Court
of New Mexico
Upon review, the Supreme
Court of New Mexico reversed the
district court's grant of summary
judgment. The court held that an
agent could orally bind an insurer
to coverage effective immediately
if such an act were within the
agent's apparent authority. The
court held that issues of fact exist-
ed as to whether N.N. Investors's
agent had apparent authority to
bind the company to a contract for
temporary insurance and whether
Streeter made material misrepre-
sentations on the insurance appli-
cation.
Apparent Authority
The Supreme Court of New
Mexico first addressed the thresh-
old matter of when Streeter's insur-
ance coverage became effective.
Ellingwood argued that N.N. In-
vestors insured Streeter prior to
noon on November 12 through
temporary insurance coverage is-
sued by N.N. Investors's agent.
Ellingwood alleged N.N. Inves-
tors's agent had apparent authority
to bind the company to temporary
coverage effective immediately.
The court defined apparent au-
thority as the authority that a
reasonable person would believe
an agent had, in light of the insur-
er's holding the agent out as an
authorized representative of the
company. The court noted that,
under common law rules, an insur-
ance agent, if authorized, could
create a valid oral contract for
insurance coverage during the peri-
od prior to the issuance or delivery
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of the policy by the company. The
court held it was a question of fact
whether N.N. Investors's agent had
apparent authority to bind the
company with respect to tempo-
rary insurance coverage.
The court reasoned that while
the terms of the agreement specifi-
cally stated that coverage was not
effective until approved by the
company, it was the duty of the
insured to examine the documents
only to the extent it was reasonable
under the circumstances. The
court stated that an insured could
be expected to rely on the agent to
explain the complex terms of an
insurance application. Therefore,
there existed an issue in this case as
to whether it was reasonable for
Streeter to rely on the agent's state-
ment that coverage was effective
upon receipt of payment.
In further support of its holding,
the court referred to affidavits of
former customers of the agent sub-
mitted by Ellingwood which
showed that despite contrary lan-
guage in the application, it was the
agent's usual procedure to repre-
sent immediate coverage with pay-
ment of the first premium. The
court stated that from these affida-
vits of former customers, a juror
could infer that it was the compa-
ny's practice to allow the agent to
collect the initial premium at the
time of completion of the applica-
tion for insurance. The court rea-
soned that an agent authorized to
receive payments would have ap-
parent authority to bind the com-
pany immediately. The court stat-
ed that a typical customer could
reasonably believe that he had pur-
chased some immediate benefit
through payment of a cash premi-
um to an insurance company's
agent. This belief would only be
reinforced by an agent's oral assur-
ance that this was the case. There-
fore, the court held this evidence
also created a jury question regard-
ing the apparent authority of N.N.
Investors's agent.
Misrepresentation
The Supreme Court of New
Mexico next addressed the issue of
whether a jury question existed
with respect to the alleged misrep-
resentations made on Streeter's in-
surance application. The court
held that a jury, relying on the
evidence in the case, could make
inferences different from those al-
leged with respect to Streeter's rep-
resentations of his medical condi-
tion.
First, the court stated that the
answers recorded by the agent on
the application were internally in-
consistent. Even though the agent
recorded negative responses to the
questions regarding various respi-
ratory diseases and muscle and
bone disorders, he nevertheless re-
corded explanations regarding
Streeter's lower spine surgery and
information about the treating
physician when such explanations
were required only for affirmative
responses. Additionally, Streeter's
spinal condition was readily appar-
ent from his physical appearance;
he wore a back brace and had a
very short torso and neck. The
court held that the agent's reluc-
tance to ask about Streeter's defor-
mity should not work to disadvan-
tage Streeter. Similarly, the court
refused to penalize Streeter's estate
for the insurer's failure to investi-
gate information alerting it to a
serious medical condition prior to
the filing of a claim. The court held
that it was a question for the jury to
decide whether the information
provided to the agent was suffi-
cient to alert N.N. Investors to
Streeter's serious spinal condition.
The court also held that Elling-
wood had introduced sufficient ev-
idence regarding Streeter's pulmo-
nary condition to preclude
summary judgment.
The Supreme Court of New
Mexico held that issues of fact
existed as to whether N.N. Inves-
tors's agent had apparent authority
to bind the company to a contract
for temporary insurance and as to
whether Streeter made material
misrepresentations on the insur-
ance application. The court there-
fore reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in
favor of N.N. Investors and re-
manded the case for trial. The
court noted that the negligence
claims relating to N.N. Investors's
agent remained before the court on
remand.
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